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1 INTRODUCTION.
For an increasing number of legal systems, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is an
obligatory and central part of planning and decision-making of important transport
infrastructure investments. (E.g. Nijkamp & Blaas 1994, Lamure 1992, Lee & Lewis 1991,
OECD 1994, Therivel 1993.) The ambitions with this instrument have been enormous. It
has been introduced in order to make possible the reliable assessment of the total effect of a
project on both non-human nature and people. However, the EIAs so far carried out are
much more restricted as to their ability to yield a sufficient and satisfactory basis for
environmentally sustainable decision-making on transport infrastructure investments.
Among the shortcomings, the following four issues are of particular importance.
Firstly, current EIAs lack the interdisciplinarity necessary for a comprehensive analysis
and assessment of the expected impact on man and nature. In particular, the exclusive
focus on technical indicators gives little room for the contributions of the social sciences
and humanities and for the non-scientific, but still highly relevant experiences of ordinary
people. Secondly, to the extent that soft values (e.g. psychological factors and ethical
issues) are taken into consideration, they are usually disregarded in the final assessment
due to their incompatibility with “hard” scientific data. This incompatibility is also
pronounced in other assessment procedures such as SIA, TA, PA and EMAS. Thirdly,
there is a widespread disagreement on the nature and range of environmental problems.
While people may share a particular terminology and rhetoric, methods and goals can still
be quite different due to basic disagreements on how to perceive and experience the world.
Fourthly, there are different suggestions as to the role of the public in planning and
decision-making. It has been largely ignored that these issues are decisive also for the
material questions at stake and their ethically acceptability.
On the basis of these problems, an integrated model for impact assessment is needed. Such
model must be based partly on conceptual analysis, partly on empirical evidence. For
empirical research, new methodological instruments should be considered, such as
“phenomenological experiments”, to serve the demands on integrative modelling.
In this paper, a discussion of methodological issues is central. It will focus on the
substitution of quantitative data wich qualitative, existential considerations and on the
nature of phenomenological experiments and their significance for integrative assessment
procedures. Next, the vital role of the public has to be established. Finally, a new model for
impact assessment is outlined which is designed to solve the compatibility problem
between soft and hard scientific data and ordinary experiences. The proposed model is also
constructed to deal with cultural differences in our perception and handling of
environmental problems.
2 THE TRANSFORMATION OF QUANTITATIVE INTO QUALITATIVE,
NORMATIVE RESEARCH.
The attempt to avoid subjective, non-controllable statements and to secure uniformity in
method and comparability of data has given quantitative research a central place in science.
Social science has largely assimilated objectives and techniques from natural science and
made it a specific goal to transform qualitative information into hard-core data,
programming the computer to process these data in an algorithmic way. Questionaires,
interviews and observational results are given mathematical expression in statistics,
geometric models and tables.
Transport and environmental research and planning is heavily relying on quantitative
analysis too, which is particularly manifest in impact assessment, cost-benefit analyses,
economic research and technical planning. It is the intention of this paper to question this
use of quantitative data and methods, in particular in relation to impact assessment of
physical transport infrastructure (although the following discussion may hold true in other
fields of research as well). A basic assumption in this paper is the fact that quantitative
analysis suppresses important normative features and prevents meaningful integrative
analysis. By “meaningful integrative analysis” I mean analysis which yields practical
knowledge suitable to decision-making, which implies (1) that the decision-basis is
inherently normative and (2) that different technical languages are translated into discourse
language which is trans-sectoral and related to concrete contexts of existential meaning. I
shall shortly explain the character and implications of these demands.
(1) The demand that knowledge in order to be practical has to be “inherently normative”
means that one’s investigation must reflect the challenges given with the interaction
between human and other natural beings. No social and natural circumstances are “neutral”
in character. To the contrary, they challenge a moral being insofar such a being has the
capacity to respond more or less adequately to a given challenge. For example, the
description of a traffic accident can never be “neutral with respect to responsibility”, as
occasionally claimed  (e.g. Schofer et al. 1995, 317). A proper description of such an
incident, i.e. a description which has practical significance, must use value-laden concepts,
such as “careless drivers”, “unattentive cyclist” and cannot be reduced to pure physical and
causal descriptions without loss of meaning. The careless driver and unattentive cycist
constitutea challenge to which “response-able” people have to respond in a way which may
be characterised as more or less adequate. This normative language is also necessarily
constitutive of an envrionmental discourse. “Pollution” is a normative concept
indispensible for environmental analysis and cannot be substituted without considerable
loss of meaning and loss of practical significance. Impact assessment presupposes a
qualitative description of the particular normative character of impact which makes an
investigation situative and interpretative. (Cf. Denzin and Lincolm 1994, 2-4.)
(2) The demand on trans-sectoral, integrative research implies that any appropriate
investigation must find a proper discourse language which is able to function as a common
denominator of basic existential concerns. This means, unless it reveals the nature of actual
challenges within a context of complex interaction of demanding natural beings in an
integrative way, the language is unfit for practical research. Fortunately, ecology,
economy, engineering science, geography, sociology, biology and ethics share a common
concern for the well-functioning of living beings and natural systems which motivates and
directs their research and forms the basis of interpretation. However, this concern for life
and will-being is more often about statistical relations than about real-life or existential
matters. Practical knowledge as searched for in transport and environmental research must
be based on a common normative denominator which reflects a true existential concern. It
is the idea of the model for impact assessment proposed below to elaborate such a
denominator as common guiding principle.
The turn to qualitative, normative analysis is motivated by the following considerations.
Firstly, while avoiding dependence on particular researchers and on the situational
constraints that shape inquiry, quantitative research is explicitly designed in abstraction
from the social, subjective and contextual features. In this respect its approach aims at
value-freeness and objectivity. However, for research aiming at practical knowledge, the
abstraction from social, subjective and contextual features in the name of objectivity is
unwarranted (Bastian & Schreiber 1994, 367). In qualitative, normative research,
objectivity is redefined as the participatory grasping of concrete interactions. To this
purpose I shall recommend the use of so-called “phenomenological experiments”. (See
below.)
Secondly, although in particular social scientists are very creative in transforming
qualitative information into numerical data, there are numerous cases where this strategy
has to be given up. For envrionmental research, Goudie observed that “primary impacts
give rise to a myriad of successive repercussions throughout the ecosystems which may be
impracticable to trace and monitor. Quantitative cause-and-effect relationships can
[therefore] seldom be established” (Goudie 1986, 294). Moreover, though the valuation of
people’s life or health can be expressed in market prices on the basis of insurance amounts,
these valuations will never reflect the true moral feelings and perceptions of those who are
affected. If we regard life and health conditions as unvaluable, those existential questions
cannot be integrated into quantitative evaluation models at all. Another example is the
estimation of people’s attitudes to the establishment of traffic-intensive, arterial roads.
Neither willingness-to-pay approaches nor cost-risk-benefit analyses will ever reflect the
significance and actual impact of a road and road traffic on actual people affected. Only
those feelings and other subjective features will normally be taken into account in an
impact assessment which fit pre-given, rational standards. Thus, focusing on quantifiable
data will exclude at least some, and probably the most important features from
investigation and any assessment on this basis is very likely to be insufficient.
Thirdly, the recent focus on threshold values raises problems not only related to the
question of whether it is possible at all to identify objective natural limits for
environmental load, but also problems of their actual practical effect. In general, it can be
claimed that the legitimate exploitation of threshold values is hardly compatible with a
cautious environmental strategy.
To avoid these problems related to quantitative research, only qualitative, normative
models have a chance to promote sustainable solutions. (Cf. also Bastian & Schreiber
1994, 38)
3 THE ROLE AND NATURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS IN
IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
To gain integrative knowledge, new trans-disciplinary methods have to be considered.
Various theories have been proposed to back up qualitative research. The present approach
is based on a combination and qualification of in particular three of these methodologies:
phenomenology, ethnomethodology and participatory research.
Phenomenology explicates how objects and experiences are meaningfully constituted and
communicated in the world of everyday life.  (Holstein & Gubrium 1994, p.264)
Phenomenologists have been reluctant to present particular methods for use in practical
research. Phenomenology is regarded to be a theory of knowledge. However, any theory of
knowledge has methodological implications. Basically, phenomenology makes use of
audiotaped conversations, but also written anectodes of personal experiences. Other
sources of phenomenological research are poetry, art (including photography and
drawings) and phenomenological literature (i.e. analyses of basic social phenomena such as
confidence, love and responsibility). The aim of ethnomethodology is not to provide causal
explanations of patterned behaviour, but to describe how members recognise, describe and
account for the order of their everyday lives. Participatory research includes participation
observation and action research, which is based on the living experiences of other people
and the researchers’ normative commitment in connection with particular case studies. Its
aim is ultimately the transformation of social practices. (Reason 1994; Atkinson &
Hammersley 1994)
The combination of ethnomethodological descriptions, participation observation, action
research and phenomenological analysis provide the framework of phenomenological
experiments.
Experiments are at the core of any scientific enterprise. The function of experiments is
partly the corroboration and falsification of theories, partly the prognosis of single data.
Not all experiments aim, however, at the determination of laws of nature and other causal
phenomena. They may just be concerned with the characteristic of single, unique events
and they may show the possibility of particular behavioural changes without committing to
statements about outcome probabilities. In this sense they contribute to what has been
called a phenomenological description. Making people familiar with particular scenes or
events by the help of “phenomenological descriptions” (which partly are based on
phenomenological experiments) is motivating and contributes to the change of social
practices. Phenomenological descriptions yield practical knowledge of particular contexts
of action.
The aim of phenomenological experiments is to provide experiences which motivate
behavioural changes (or confirm and strengthen those attitudes and practices which already
are largely in agreement with the particular experiences). These changes are changes of the
participants or - through phenomenological descriptions - of other actors.
Phenomenological experiments are designed to involve both mental and bodily functions,
i.e. they try to comprehend the participant as an interactive being, whose behavioural
features cannot be reduced to obsevational data or subjective representations. Performing
phenomenological experiments, the investigator has to involve himself in the experiential
situation of the investigated agent and use a wide range of metodological approaches to
secure a comprehensive data collection. Actually, he has to share the experiences of the
testee. Probably, the most appropriate way to register and present these shared experiences
will not be by tables and numbers, but by making committed and committing descriptions
of the phenomenal experiences.
The role and nature of phenomenological experiments is to provide comprehensive
knowledge of particular normative facts. Phenomenological experiments and
phenomenological descriptions form part of a knowledgebase which includes, besides what
might be called “knowledge of special experiences” (German: “Erfahrungswissen”),
“knowledge of everyday experiences” (German: “Alltagswissen”) and “scientific
knowledge” (German: “ExpertInnenwissen”). With increasing public participation the
knowledge of everyday and special experiences obtain increasing significance. (Rüede et
al. 1997.)
Beyond the effect on future behavioural patterns of individual actors, there is a need for
aggregating results for the purpose of project and plan assessment. This may be done in
several ways. Rüede et al. (1997) have developed an interpretation framework which takes
its departure in four different perception functions (valuing, anticipating, relating,
establishing facts) and two types of attitudes (introverted, extroverted).
Another approach would be to identify basic categories of references which function as
common denominators of fundamental life conditions (conditions of co-existence) across
scientific terminologies and ordinary language. This approach will be followed here. Fig.1
identifies three aspects of basic life conditions within a pollution - non-pollution
framework. Impact assessment has to give up the focus on a few measurable indicators in
favour of an effort in struggling pollution in relation to the triad aspects of life conditions.
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Fig.1: Basic existential referents in impact assessment
On the basis of this interpretation scheme, a projects or plans impact on natural phenomena
(including man and society) could be assessed with extensive involvement of the public.
4 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN IMPACT ASSESSMENTS.
This last aspect is important because it is generally stated that the public should be
involved to some reasonable degree in the discussion of projects and plans requiring
Impact Assessment. (E.g. Elling & Nielsen 1996, EIA Centre 1995.) Although it is
repeatedly emphasised that this should take place as early as possible, it has not been
claimed that the process should be open for the public in all its phases, nor that it should be
governed and controlled by the public. The focus on conditions of co-existence, however,
gives these latter demands a profound importance. Moreover, as far as transport
infrastructure is concerned, the consumer perspective has to be subordinated a citizen
perspective. The relevant question is not what can society and nature provide for the
individual consumer, but rather what are the adequate conditions for citizens to involve in
socially and naturally responsible behaviour.
With the focus on public governance of Impact Assessment procedures, demands on
participants must be strengthened. At least, two related demands must be made:
(1) Because public participation is related to plans ans projects of public interest, the most
relevant arguments and statements will be those which express common concerns (citizen
perspective). This will exclude most instances of nimbyism. In other words, particular
interests (consumer interests) have to be subordinated to public interests (citizens interests,
shared goals, “the common good”).
(2) Public participation is not a non-obligating, purely verbal activity, but a social process
with corresponding duties and obligations. Therefore, a demand on participation in impact
assessment procedures must be the willingness and commitment of individual agents
(citizens) to share experiences, to face particular challenges with an open mind, to respond
in a for moral agents adequate and optimal way and to take responsibility for decisions
made.
When many survey studies have to face the problem of serious clashes
between expressed opinions and actual behaviour, the primary reason for this is the lack of
obligations. It is free to express opinions which do not commit to particular
behaviour.Therefore, we need empirical studies which have built-in commitments
(sanctions).
 At  least two models could formally satisfy these criteria.
Most popular is the social discourse model which allows access of all citizens but demands
the observance of certain rational criteria for what counts as legitimate and significant
contributions. Habermas’ thought that the best arguments should prevail is typical for this
kind of approach. (See e.g. Khisty 1996.) Another model may sort out lack of competences
from the very beginning and demand of social discourses that only qualified citizens, e.g.
certain experienced, informed and committing people, have actual access to planning and
decision procedures. In both models it should be claimed that what must govern the
discussions is not the desire of balancing interests and achieving viable compromises, but
the will to reach the right solution to what is identified as the common good. This implies a
real synthesis of available competences.
The competences necessary to make assessments and to recommend solutions are primarily
moral competences. Moral competences grow with degree and intensity of direct
interhuman and man-nature relationships. To the extent people’s interactions are
(technologically or institutionally) mediated, however, moral judgments are likely to be
distorted and may over time degenerate. This is the case where we communicate through
computers, laws, cars or within separate traffic lines. (See Zeitler 1997 and Bastian &
Schreiber 1994, 384.) Systemic mediation (instiutions, technology) is also responsible for
time pollution which particularly threatens the time-demanding activities of moral
judgments.
It is part of a strategy for impact assessment that complementary steps are taken to promote
a policy which develops moral capacities. The success of public participation is dependent
on the successful development of moral capacities on the basis of shared experiences. To
share social experiences and a communality with non-human nature is an important
condition of perceiving the common good and feeling obliged to its attainment. To prevent
the danger of “over-planning” (Engwicht 1997), the process has to be open, but must
commit the participants.
5 IMPACT ASSESSMENT - ABOUT CHECKLISTS AND THEIR INTEGRATION
INTO A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
A usual way of making impact assessments is by formulation checklists, numerically listed
or put into tables for use of cross-checking. Checklists for EIA usually include social
matters such as the impact of a plan or policy on employment or communal and private
services. The question of what to include in those checklists and how to evaluate the actual
data is essential for the significance and reliability of the model.
From the point of view of the citizen, his co-existential conditions include features of his
social and natural context and those particular features which characterise his actual
situation at any time. Therefore, general threshold values are probably of little significance
for him. For example, a  noise expert declaring noise levels from rural roads under 55 dB
as acceptable, makes no significant statement in those cases where one’s reason for moving
to the rural residential area is its peacefulness. It makes no difference to the residents
whether the noise level in their area would rise to 45dB or 55dB because in both cases their
main motiv for living in the rural area would be removed (Juslen 1997).
The point of reference for any impact assessment is the particular condition of concrete
inter-human and man-nature relationships. Any change in physical infrastructure will affect
human and non-human beings. For a comprehensive and proper assessment of this impact
the particular circumstances have to be evaluated in relation to any affected moral subject
(human beings, animals, plants, ecosystems, etc.). The proper criterion for such an
evaluation are not quantitative measures (environmental load, threshold values, etc.), but
decisions based on a fundamental respect for the moral status of the affected beings and
systems and their particual co-existential conditions. The only judge in this connection are
morally competent agents who perform a moral decision on the basis of informed and
sensitive interactions and shared experiences. The use of qualitative measures means that
assessment comes closer to the essential problems and their complexity and ensures a
relatively open decision basis and extensive public participation (Elling & Nielsen 1996,
74).
6 MODEL FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND ASSESSMENT RULES.
The major criterion for Impact Assessment is impact on conditions of co-existence (e.g.
Sukopp & Wittig 1993, 356), including the moral competences essential for successful
symbiotic behaviour. As a general rule impacts have to be evaluated in relation to the
question whether the activity concerned makes it possible or prevents moral agents from
making proper, i.e. responsible decisions. Any physical infrastructure, technology or any
other particular measure which forces people to act in morally reprehensibly ways has to be
assessed negatively. Negative impacts can also be termed “pollutive”. “Pollution” is just
another word for the negative impact on conditions of co-existence or, what is literally the
same, for the impairment of capacities of moral judgment.
By focusing on co-existence  and not just existence, I shall exclude short-sighted,
individual want-satisfactions which do not pay attention to their social and natural
contexts. The important thing is not to protect each individuals separate rights and
interests, but to recognise the symbiotic context of any being as the natural starting-point
for analysis. It is assumed that any human or other individual can only be identified and
respected, if it/she/he is not unduly abstracted from its/her/his life context. When we insist
on somebody’s right to a good environment, the problem is not the well-being or survival
of the single individual, but a disturbed or distorted relationship between so-called rights-
holder and other co-existing beings. The focus on cross-checking within impact assessment
lists has exactly this function. However, these lists don’t work satisfactorily as long as
different terminologies block out comparative analysis. Therefore, we need existential
referents as listed in table 1.
Below fig.2 is a graphical representation of the general structure of impact assessment,
applicable to assessments of projects, plans and strategies.  Tab.1 explains the elements of
impact assessment in detail. It must be observed that environmental issues and social
issues, human and non-human concerns are integrated into this scheme and no priority
rules are given. Tab.2 describes general assessment rules and the specification of the extent
to which the public is involved in this process.
Fig.2: General model of impact assessment
The sources of impact consist of activities which are located within an activity field. The
activities and their impact are determined by the particular technology and the character of
the landscape, the latter makes a differentiated view on land use necessary. Impacts can be
distinguished according to their particular character (see types of impact below) and to
their effect on particular moral subjects.
Activity Field Typical Land Use
Transport Rural Landscape
Recreation Townscape/Streetscape
Work Waterscape, Airscape
Other “stationary” activities Housing
Tab.1a:  Activity field and typical land use.
Activities
 Land Use
 Technology
ACTIVITY FIELD
CUMULATIVE
IMPACT
SYNERGETICInstituti
onal
framew
ork
Moral subjects:
townscape, landscape,
minerals, water, soil,
air, individuals,
ecosystems, culture,
animals, plants,
etc.
Technology Institutional framework
Highspeed/Lowspeed technology Law
Hightech Social institutions (family, household,
marriage, democratic decision-making
practices, etc.
Mediumtech
Lowtech
Political institutions
Economic mechanisms
Institutionalisation, Organisation Labour market
Tab.1b: Technology as mediator and typical institutional framework.
Types of Negative Impact: Pollution
Noise
Smell / Odour
Particle Emission
Time Pollution
Space Pollution
Light / Darkness
Resource Deterioration / Exhaustion
Ugliness
Exchange impairment
Non-vigorous development
Impairment of power and sensibility
Tab.1c: Types of negative impact / forms of pollution.
Impacts are relative in meaning, significance and extent to the particular moral subjects
and their circumstances. For centuries it has been an uncontested assumption in modern
liberal society to reserve the status of moral subjects to human beings and that of moral
agents to a subclass of humanity, namely rational, experienced people.
However recently, not only beyond moderne Western culture, but also as a result of critical
reflection within that culture, this classical anthropocentric attitude has been repeatedly
challenged.  Considering the impact of our activities, Nature (not only human nature) has
been awarded the status of moral relevance. Environmental impacts are not only impact of
significance for human well-being and survival, but have some kind of moral importance
of its own. It is now largely accepted that certain animals, plants and landscapes as well as
urban heritages and natural resources should be preserved not only for present and future
human societies, but partly also for their own sake and without identifiable utility effect.
As a consequence, the class of moral subjects should be kept as open as possible.
Clearly, the way a human being fulfills its role as moral subject is quite different from the
way a particular animal, plant, a ecosystem or substance should be treated. Accordingly,
the impact of a particular pollutive phenomenon (e.g. noise or darkness) is different among
different moral subjects. A few remarks may illustrate this point.
Living beings (humans, animals, plants, etc.) respond naturally to given challenges. Their
“response-ability”, however, is quite different and thus our expectations to them - which
form the basis of complaints - must be relative to their particular capacities.  To treat
specific natural phenomena inadequately, i.e. to impose an impact on them which affects
them adversely, means to neglect their particular nature or capacities, or, in other words, to
impair their ability to respond properly to various challenges. Examples are the impairment
of the moral judgement of human beings, the prevention of domestic animals to use and
develop their natural instincts (e.g. scraping of hens, etc.), the transgression of the carrying
capacity of an ecosystem, the weakening of the resistance of organisms, etc. In impact
assessment, the crucial question, therefore, is to whether any plan or project is likely to
affect the capacities of natural phenomena (man included) to respond properly to present
and future challenges.
Although the extention of the status of moral subjects to other natural beings is still far
from being universally accepted, its line of reasoning is at least conceivable. This is not
necessarily the case with moral subjects like “landscape”, “townscape”, “water”, “soil” or
“cultural heritage”. How can a landscape be a moral subject? A piece of nature is said to be
a “landscape”, if we take it as a sensory experience without any utility function. The piece
of nature imposes an impression on us which is not purely subjective but originates from
the interaction between the human agent and the particular natural phenomenon called
“landscape”. Landscape is the total sensory impression of some piece of nature which is
aroused in a sensitive human being. (Hellpach 1950, 107). This means that for other natural
beings, the character of a landscape may be less important or not important at all or have a
quite different meaning. Therefore, assessing the impact of any plan or project on
landscape involves primarily the careful investigation of the empowering interaction
between beings with aesthetic and other sensory capabilities and a particular segment of
natural phenomena. To the extent the sensory and related capacities of co-existing
individuals is adversely affected by man-made changes of the landscape, these impacts on
the landscape should - from a moral point of view - be avoided. In this case, the landscape
is not an independent moral subject, but is defined contextually as a dynamic relation
between a human, sensitive agent and another specified natural phenomenon. The beauty
of a landscape (which is said should be morally preserved) is not an objective quality of a
piece of nature, but its potential to create a perception of beauty in certain sensitive beings.
In relation to human beings, the impairment of moral judgment is crucial in impact
assessment. It threatens one of our most vital capacities as responsible human agents and
prevents future responsible decisions.  Therefore, a general guiding idea in any impact
assessment procedure is to raise the question whether the activity concerned has a negative
impact on our capacity to act as morally responsible beings. Having this in mind, we may
formulate the following Assessment Rules, for short called SPEAK-PRO, where SPEAK is
concerned with the major steps in Impact Assessment and PRO deals with the involvement
of the public in this process.
Assessment Rules SPEAK
Screening and scoping. Preliminary
overview and classification of problems. S
Phenomenological experiments,
interviews and other field work. P
Effect analysis. Single, cumulative and
synergetic effects. E
Evaluation of Alternatives. A
Knocking down pollution.
Countermeasures. Feedback. K
Public Governance PRO
Proposals. Mail boxes and audiences for
the public to give comments / make
proposals (as known from Quality
Circles).
Participation in phenomenological expe-
riments.
P
Reviewing different options and
interpretations in fokus groups (not based
on interest balancing but out of
motivations to serve the common good).
Open to all with qualifying motivations.
R
Ombudsman institution for decision
making. Independent of political parties
and interest groups. Observer and
mediator. Monitor.
O
Tab.2: SPEAK-PRO. Assessment rules and public governance.
The SPEAK-rules are supposed to be performed with extensive public government.
Scientific experts are involved in effect assessment (E), the formulation of viable
alternatives (A) and the design of countermeasures (K). However, their contributions will
be critically screened by the responsible working groups and the ombudsman and they will
be asked to interprete their work in relation to baisc co-existential referents. The
ombudsman has as his primary function to act as mediator and to observe that the
procedure adheres to the central ethical objectives of the assessment.
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